Introduction
Greenland, as an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, occupies a unique position in international law and treaty-making processes. While it is not a fully independent sovereign state, Greenland has been granted significant self-governance through the Act on Greenland Self-Government of 2009, which delineates its authority in various domains, including aspects of international relations. This article explores Greenland’s treaty-making process within its constitutional framework, focusing on how it legally enters into treaties, its approach to integrating international commitments into domestic law, and its relationship with key international legal instruments such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969. By examining these elements, the discussion also sheds light on how other countries might effectively engage with Greenland in treaty-making endeavors. This analysis is crucial for understanding the nuances of Greenland’s position in global affairs, especially given its strategic geopolitical location and growing interest in Arctic resources.
The article is structured as follows: first, it outlines the constitutional and legal framework governing Greenland’s autonomy and treaty-making capacity. Second, it examines whether Greenland adopts a monist or dualist approach to treaties and how international commitments are implemented in national law. Third, it discusses Greenland’s status concerning the VCLT 1969 and the implications for international partners. Finally, it provides insights into how this framework informs other countries on engaging in treaty-making with Greenland.
Constitutional Framework for Treaty-Making in Greenland
Greenland’s constitutional framework is primarily defined by the Act on Greenland Self-Government (Act No. 473 of 12 June 2009), which was passed by the Danish Parliament and came into effect following a referendum in Greenland. This Act replaced the earlier Home Rule Act of 1979 and significantly expanded Greenland’s autonomy, granting it authority over a wide range of internal affairs while reserving certain powers, including foreign affairs and defense, to the Danish government. However, the Act also provides mechanisms through which Greenland can participate in international relations and treaty-making under specific conditions.
Under Section 11 of the Act on Greenland Self-Government, the Greenlandic government is granted the right to negotiate and conclude agreements with foreign states and international organizations in areas falling within its jurisdiction. This includes matters such as trade, fisheries, and environmental protection—key areas of interest given Greenland’s Arctic context. However, such agreements must be concluded “on behalf of the Realm” (i.e., the Kingdom of Denmark) and require the consent of the Danish government. This provision reflects the shared sovereignty model under which Greenland operates, where ultimate authority for foreign affairs remains with Denmark, but Greenland has a significant degree of agency in matters directly affecting its interests.
Furthermore, Section 12 of the Act allows the Greenlandic government to participate in international negotiations concerning matters of particular importance to Greenland. This includes the right to representation in Danish delegations or, in some cases, to act as the primary negotiator with the Danish government’s approval. These provisions ensure that Greenland’s voice is heard on the international stage, especially in areas like Arctic governance and climate change, where its interests are directly implicated. For example, Greenland has been actively involved in negotiations related to the Arctic Council, often with Danish oversight, to address environmental and indigenous rights issues (Koivurova, 2011).
Section 13 of the Act addresses treaties that may affect Greenland’s interests or require legislative or administrative action within Greenland. It stipulates that the Danish government must consult the Greenlandic government before entering into such treaties. If the Greenlandic government objects to a treaty, the Danish government must decide whether to proceed, potentially leading to political negotiations or compensations. This mechanism ensures that Greenland maintains influence over international commitments that impact its population and resources, even if the ultimate treaty-making power resides with Denmark.
In practice, this constitutional arrangement creates a hybrid model of treaty-making. Greenland can initiate and negotiate agreements in fields within its competence, but these must be aligned with the broader interests of the Kingdom of Denmark and often require formal Danish ratification. This framework balances Greenland’s push for greater autonomy with the legal and political realities of remaining part of the Danish Realm. For instance, agreements concerning natural resource extraction—a key economic driver for Greenland—often involve coordination between Greenlandic authorities and Danish foreign affairs officials to ensure compliance with international law and Danish policy (Ackrén, 2014).
Monist or Dualist Approach to Treaties in Greenland
The distinction between monist and dualist systems in international law relates to how treaties are integrated into domestic legal frameworks. In a monist system, international law is automatically part of national law upon ratification, without the need for additional domestic legislation. In contrast, a dualist system requires explicit legislative action to incorporate international treaties into domestic law, treating international and national law as separate systems (Cassese, 2005).
Greenland operates within the broader legal framework of the Kingdom of Denmark, which traditionally follows a dualist approach to international law. In Denmark, treaties do not automatically become part of national law upon ratification; instead, they must be incorporated through legislative acts passed by the Danish Parliament (Folketing). This dualist tradition extends to Greenland, albeit with nuances due to its autonomous status. Under the Act on Greenland Self-Government, Greenland’s legislative body, the Inatsisartut, has the authority to pass laws in areas of its competence. When a treaty negotiated or acceded to by Greenland (with Danish approval) requires domestic implementation, it is the responsibility of the Inatsisartut to enact corresponding legislation if the matter falls within Greenland’s jurisdiction (Spiermann, 2004).
This process demonstrates a dualist approach, as international commitments do not have direct effect in Greenlandic law without legislative action. For example, environmental agreements concerning Arctic conservation, to which Greenland may be a party through Denmark, often require the Inatsisartut to pass regulations to enforce compliance at the local level. This requirement for legislative incorporation ensures that treaties are adapted to Greenland’s specific legal and cultural context, which may differ from mainland Denmark’s priorities. However, in cases where a treaty pertains to areas outside Greenland’s competence (e.g., defense or monetary policy), the Danish Folketing retains the authority to implement the treaty through Danish law, which may then apply to Greenland as part of the Realm.
The dualist approach in Greenland is further complicated by the collaborative nature of its relationship with Denmark. If a treaty has implications for both Greenlandic and Danish law, there may be a coordinated effort to ensure consistent implementation across the Realm. This is particularly evident in human rights treaties or trade agreements, where Denmark may incorporate a treaty at the national level while Greenland enacts supplementary legislation to address local considerations. For instance, Greenland has tailored certain aspects of international trade agreements to prioritize indigenous Inuit economic interests, even as Denmark handles broader trade negotiations (Høegh, 2017).
Thus, Greenland’s approach to treaties mirrors Denmark’s dualist system, requiring domestic legislative action to give effect to international commitments. However, the autonomy granted under the 2009 Act allows Greenland to play a proactive role in shaping how treaties are implemented within its jurisdiction, distinguishing its application of dualism from that of a fully sovereign state.
Greenland and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969 is a cornerstone of international law, codifying customary rules governing the formation, interpretation, and termination of treaties. Adopted on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980, the VCLT provides a framework for how states interact in treaty-making, ensuring clarity and predictability in international obligations. A critical question for understanding Greenland’s treaty-making process is whether it is a party to the VCLT and how this status influences its international engagements.
Greenland, as a non-sovereign entity, is not an independent party to the VCLT. The Kingdom of Denmark, however, ratified the VCLT on 18 April 1970, and as part of the Danish Realm, Greenland is bound by the Convention through Denmark’s accession. Denmark’s ratification extends to its territories, including Greenland, unless explicitly excluded, which is not the case for the VCLT. As a result, the principles and rules of the VCLT apply to treaties involving Greenland, particularly those negotiated or concluded on behalf of the Realm (Hollis, 2012).
The application of the VCLT to Greenland is significant for several reasons. First, it ensures that treaties involving Greenland adhere to international standards, including rules on treaty validity, interpretation (as per Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT), and termination. This provides a predictable legal framework for other states engaging with Greenland, as they can rely on the VCLT’s provisions even though Greenland itself is not a direct signatory. For example, agreements concerning Arctic resource management or maritime boundaries must conform to VCLT principles, such as good faith and pacta sunt servanda (Article 26), which obliges parties to perform treaty obligations in good faith.
Second, Greenland’s indirect participation in the VCLT through Denmark underscores the importance of involving Danish authorities in treaty processes. Since Greenland’s treaty-making capacity operates within the constraints of the Danish constitutional framework, other states must ensure that agreements with Greenland are concluded with Denmark’s consent to avoid legal challenges under international law. The VCLT’s rules on the capacity to conclude treaties (Articles 6 and 7) emphasize that only entities with treaty-making capacity under international law can validly enter into agreements, further reinforcing the need for Danish involvement.
For other countries, this dynamic offers both clarity and caution. On one hand, the VCLT’s applicability through Denmark assures foreign partners that treaty processes involving Greenland are grounded in established international norms. On the other hand, it highlights the necessity of navigating the dual layers of authority—Greenlandic and Danish—when negotiating treaties. Failure to secure Danish approval could render an agreement with Greenland legally questionable under international law, as Greenland lacks full sovereign capacity to act independently (Crawford, 2012).
Implementing Treaties in National Law: Process and Challenges
As noted earlier, Greenland follows a dualist approach to integrating treaties into national law, necessitating legislative action by the Inatsisartut in areas within its competence. This process begins once a treaty is negotiated and concluded with Danish approval. If the treaty pertains to matters under Greenlandic jurisdiction, such as environmental regulation or fisheries management, the Greenlandic government proposes legislation to the Inatsisartut to align domestic law with the treaty’s obligations. Public consultation may occur, particularly on issues affecting indigenous communities, to ensure that local perspectives are incorporated into the legislative process.
One challenge in this implementation process is the potential for discrepancy between Greenlandic and Danish interpretations of a treaty’s scope and obligations. Since Denmark retains ultimate authority over foreign affairs, it may interpret a treaty in a manner that conflicts with Greenlandic priorities. For instance, a trade agreement negotiated by Denmark might prioritize broader European Union interests, while Greenland may seek to protect local industries. Resolving such conflicts requires dialogue and negotiation, often facilitated through mechanisms outlined in the Act on Greenland Self-Government, particularly Sections 11 and 13 (Ackrén & Jakobsen, 2015).
Another challenge is capacity. Greenland’s relatively small legislative and administrative infrastructure can Struggle to keep pace with the demands of implementing complex international agreements, especially those related to environmental standards or resource governance. Technical assistance from Denmark or international partners is sometimes necessary to build capacity for compliance, as seen in Greenland’s efforts to align with international climate change frameworks (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019).
Despite these challenges, Greenland has demonstrated a commitment to fulfilling international obligations within its areas of competence. Its legislative process allows for flexibility in adapting treaties to local needs, ensuring that international commitments are not merely imposed but are contextualized to reflect Greenlandic realities. This approach can serve as a model for other autonomous or sub-state entities seeking to balance international engagement with local governance.
Implications for Other Countries Engaging with Greenland
Greenland’s unique treaty-making framework offers several lessons for other countries seeking to enter into agreements with it. First, it is imperative to recognize Greenland’s autonomy while acknowledging Denmark’s overarching sovereignty in foreign affairs. Countries must engage with both Greenlandic and Danish authorities to ensure the legal validity of treaties under international law. Direct negotiations with Greenland are possible and often encouraged in areas of its competence, but formal consent from Denmark is typically required to finalize an agreement.
Second, the applicability of the VCLT through Denmark provides reassurance that treaty processes involving Greenland adhere to international norms. Foreign states can rely on the VCLT’s principles for clarity on issues such as treaty interpretation and dispute resolution. However, they must also be mindful of Greenland’s dualist approach, which means that treaty obligations may not be immediately enforceable in Greenland without domestic legislation. This may necessitate patience and diplomacy to ensure that Greenland’s Inatsisartut has sufficient time and resources to implement agreements.
Third, other countries should prioritize areas of mutual interest, such as environmental protection, resource management, and indigenous rights, when negotiating treaties with Greenland. Given its Arctic location and the global significance of climate change, Greenland is a critical partner in multilateral agreements concerning the polar region. Engaging Greenland directly on these issues, while respecting the Danish framework, can foster trust and cooperation (Koivurova & Hasanat, 2012).
Finally, Greenland’s evolving push for greater autonomy, including potential future independence, suggests that its treaty-making capacity may continue to expand. Other countries should remain adaptable, monitoring developments in Greenland-Denmark relations to adjust their diplomatic strategies accordingly. A proactive approach that respects Greenland’s current legal status while anticipating future changes will be key to successful long-term partnerships.
Conclusion
Greenland’s treaty-making process operates within a complex constitutional framework defined by the Act on Greenland Self-Government of 2009. While Greenland enjoys significant autonomy to negotiate and conclude agreements in areas within its jurisdiction, its treaty-making capacity is ultimately tied to the Kingdom of Denmark, requiring Danish consent for international commitments. The dualist approach to treaties in Greenland necessitates legislative action by the Inatsisartut to integrate international obligations into national law, ensuring that such commitments are contextualized to local needs and priorities.
Although Greenland is not an independent party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, it is bound by its provisions through Denmark’s ratification, providing a stable legal foundation for treaty processes. This status informs other countries that engaging with Greenland requires coordination with Danish authorities to ensure compliance with international law. Moreover, it highlights the importance of patience and capacity-building to support Greenland in implementing treaties domestically.
As Greenland continues to assert its role on the international stage, particularly in Arctic governance and resource management, its treaty-making framework will remain a critical area of study. Other countries can draw valuable lessons from Greenland’s hybrid model, balancing autonomy with shared sovereignty, to build effective and legally sound partnerships. Future research could explore how Greenland’s treaty-making capacity might evolve with potential independence, further shaping its contributions to international law and global cooperation.
References
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