Introduction
The Ottawa Convention, formally known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, represents a landmark achievement in international humanitarian law and disarmament. Adopted on September 18, 1997, and entering into force on March 1, 1999, the treaty seeks to eliminate anti-personnel landmines (APLs), which have caused immense civilian suffering in conflict and post-conflict zones worldwide. As of recent data available on the web, 166 states have ratified or acceded to the treaty, reflecting a significant global consensus on the need to eradicate these indiscriminate weapons. However, the journey towards a mine-free world remains fraught with challenges, including non-signatory states, ongoing conflicts, and emerging geopolitical tensions leading to withdrawals from the treaty.
This article examines the global impact of the Ottawa Convention, evaluating the progress made in reducing the threat of APLs and the persistent challenges hindering complete eradication. It also explores the legal mechanisms through which states can enter into the treaty, focusing on the provisions of the Convention itself. Additionally, it addresses the question of whether states adopt a monist or dualist approach to integrating treaties into national law, using a generalized perspective since the specific country is not identified. Finally, the article considers the relationship between the Ottawa Convention and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969, and how this informs the process of treaty accession for other states.
Global Impact of the Ottawa Convention
Progress in Eradicating Anti-Personnel Mines
The Ottawa Convention has achieved remarkable progress since its inception. Under Article 4 of the Convention, states parties are obliged to destroy their stockpiled APLs within four years of becoming a party to the treaty. As a result, millions of mines have been destroyed globally, significantly reducing the potential for future harm. According to data from the Arms Control Association, over 55 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed by states parties as of recent updates. Mine clearance efforts mandated under Article 5, which requires the clearance of all mined areas within ten years (with possible extensions), have also led to the liberation of vast swathes of land for civilian use, enabling economic development and safe return for displaced populations.
Furthermore, the treaty, under Article 6, encourages international cooperation and assistance, fostering partnerships between states, NGOs, and international organizations like the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Programs for victim assistance, outlined in Article 6(3), have provided rehabilitation, medical care, and socio-economic reintegration for landmine survivors in numerous countries. The stigma associated with APLs has grown due to the treaty’s advocacy efforts, discouraging their use even among non-signatory states in some instances.
The Convention’s impact extends beyond tangible outcomes to normative shifts. It has set a precedent for humanitarian disarmament, inspiring subsequent treaties like the Convention on Cluster Munitions. By prioritizing civilian protection over military utility, it has reshaped international discourse on weapons of indiscriminate harm.
Challenges to Complete Eradication
Despite these successes, significant challenges remain. One of the foremost issues is the non-participation of major military powers and key regional players. As noted in web-based information from the Arms Control Association, 34 states, including the United States, Russia, and China, remain non-signatories. These countries are historical producers and stockpilers of APLs, and their absence undermines the treaty’s universality. In regions of persistent tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, few states have joined the Convention, limiting its effectiveness in conflict zones where mines continue to be deployed.
Recent geopolitical developments have further complicated the treaty’s objectives. Reports from 2025 indicate that several states, including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Ukraine, have either initiated withdrawal procedures or expressed intent to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, citing security concerns amid the Russo-Ukrainian War. This trend, highlighted by sources such as the Lieber Institute and the Human Rights Research Council, signals a troubling regression. Russia’s use of mines during the conflict, despite being a non-signatory, has prompted some states parties to reconsider their commitments, challenging the treaty’s normative framework.
Additionally, funding shortages for mine clearance and victim assistance remain a barrier. While wealthier states have provided resources under Article 6, many affected countries lack the capacity to meet their obligations without sustained international support. Non-state actors, including insurgent groups, continue to use improvised explosive devices and mines, which fall outside direct treaty regulation but share similar humanitarian impacts. Finally, extensions for mine clearance under Article 5 are frequently requested, delaying progress in heavily contaminated regions like Angola and Cambodia.
Legal Mechanisms for Entering into the Ottawa Convention
The Ottawa Convention provides clear legal pathways for states to join the treaty, ensuring accessibility for nations committed to its goals. Article 16 outlines the process of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. For states present at the adoption of the treaty in 1997, ratification is typically the method of formal consent following signature, requiring domestic approval processes such as parliamentary endorsement. For states not initially involved, accession under Article 16(2) allows direct entry without prior signature, a mechanism that has enabled many countries to join post-1999.
Article 17 specifies the entry into force for new states parties. For ratifying or acceding states, the treaty enters into force on the first day of the sixth month after the deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession with the Depositary, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This delay provides a preparatory period for states to align domestic policies with treaty obligations, such as initiating stockpile destruction under Article 4 or identifying mined areas under Article 5.
The Convention also addresses reservations and withdrawals, critical aspects of treaty law. Article 19 explicitly prohibits reservations, ensuring that states cannot opt out of specific provisions, thereby maintaining the treaty’s integrity. However, Article 20 allows for withdrawal, provided a state notifies the Depositary six months in advance, with the withdrawal taking effect one year after notification, or later if the state is engaged in armed conflict. Recent withdrawals by states like Finland, as reported by the Library of Congress in 2025, illustrate the practical application of this provision amid security concerns.
Monist vs. Dualist Approaches to Treaty Incorporation
The integration of international treaties like the Ottawa Convention into national law varies based on whether a state adopts a monist or dualist approach to international law. Since the specific country in question is not identified in this context, a-generalized discussion is provided to clarify these concepts and their implications for treaty implementation.
In a monist system, international law and domestic law are considered part of a unified legal order. Treaties, once ratified or acceded to, automatically become part of national law without the need for additional legislation. This approach facilitates swift implementation of treaty obligations, as seen in countries like the Netherlands, where ratified treaties have direct effect under certain conditions. For the Ottawa Convention, a monist state would immediately recognize prohibitions on APLs as binding domestic law, potentially simplifying compliance with Articles 1 (general obligations) and 9 (national implementation measures).
In contrast, dualist systems view international and domestic law as separate spheres. Treaties do not have direct effect in national law until they are incorporated through domestic legislation. The United Kingdom exemplifies this approach, where parliamentary acts are required to translate international commitments into enforceable domestic law. For the Ottawa Convention, a dualist state would need to enact laws prohibiting APL use, stockpiling, and production, aligning with Article 9, which mandates states to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures” to prevent and suppress prohibited activities.
The choice between monist and dualist approaches affects the speed and efficacy of treaty implementation. Monist states may face fewer legislative hurdles, but domestic courts might struggle with interpreting treaty provisions without specific guidance. Dualist states, while potentially slower in implementation, ensure that treaty obligations are tailored to national legal frameworks, enhancing clarity and enforceability. For the Ottawa Convention, the dualist approach often results in comprehensive legislation on mine clearance and victim assistance, but delays can hinder timely compliance with deadlines under Articles 4 and 5.
Regardless of the system, Article 9 of the Convention requires states parties to adopt necessary measures to enforce treaty obligations domestically. This provision accommodates both monist and dualist traditions by emphasizing the end goal—effective implementation—over the specific method. States must report on these measures under Article 7 (transparency measures), providing annual updates to the UN Secretary-General on progress in aligning national laws with treaty commitments.
Relationship with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), adopted in 1969, serves as the foundational framework for the formation, interpretation, and termination of international treaties. It codifies customary international law on treaties, providing rules that apply even to states not party to the VCLT itself. The question of whether the Ottawa Convention is a “party” to the VCLT requires clarification: treaties themselves are not parties to other treaties; rather, states are parties to treaties, and the VCLT governs the legal relationships between states in treaty-making.
The Ottawa Convention, as a multilateral treaty, operates within the legal framework established by the VCLT. Many of its procedural aspects, such as rules on ratification, accession, and withdrawal (Articles 16 and 20 of the Ottawa Convention), mirror provisions in the VCLT, particularly Articles 11-16 on means of expressing consent to be bound and Articles 54-56 on termination and withdrawal. The Ottawa Convention’s negotiation and adoption process in 1997 adhered to principles of treaty formation under VCLT Article 9 (adoption of the text) and Article 10 (authentication of the text), ensuring its legitimacy as an international agreement.
Most states parties to the Ottawa Convention are also parties to the VCLT, meaning their engagement with the Convention is informed by VCLT rules. For instance, VCLT Article 27, which prohibits states from invoking internal law as justification for failure to perform treaty obligations, reinforces the binding nature of Ottawa Convention commitments. This is particularly relevant for dualist states, where domestic legislative delays cannot excuse non-compliance with stockpile destruction or mine clearance deadlines.
For states not party to the VCLT, such as those who have not ratified it or for whom it does not reflect customary law in specific aspects, the VCLT still serves as a reference point due to its codification of widely accepted norms. This universality informs other countries on how to properly enter into treaties like the Ottawa Convention. States must adhere to the principle of pacta sunt servanda (VCLT Article 26), ensuring good faith in fulfilling obligations. They must also follow formal processes of consent, whether through ratification or accession, as outlined in both the VCLT and the Ottawa Convention’s own provisions.
The VCLT’s influence extends to interpretation and dispute resolution. Under VCLT Article 31, treaties must be interpreted in good faith based on their ordinary meaning, context, and object and purpose. For the Ottawa Convention, this principle guides the application of ambiguous provisions, such as the scope of “assistance” under Article 6. Should disputes arise regarding treaty implementation, VCLT Article 33 on interpretation in multiple languages ensures clarity, given the Ottawa Convention’s availability in six UN languages, as noted by UNODA.
Thus, while the Ottawa Convention is not a “party” to the VCLT, its legal framework is deeply informed by VCLT principles. This relationship provides a model for other states on treaty engagement, emphasizing the importance of formal consent, adherence to procedural norms, and good faith implementation. States considering accession to the Ottawa Convention can draw on VCLT guidance to ensure their entry aligns with international legal standards, enhancing the treaty’s global reach and effectiveness.
Broader Implications and Recommendations
The Ottawa Convention’s impact, while significant, reveals the complexities of achieving universal disarmament in a fragmented geopolitical landscape. The progress in stockpile destruction and mine clearance demonstrates the potential for humanitarian-focused treaties to drive tangible change. However, the challenges posed by non-signatories, withdrawals, and resource constraints necessitate renewed strategies.
First, diplomatic efforts must prioritize engaging non-signatory states, particularly major powers. Confidence-building measures, such as transparency in military doctrines and commitments to non-use of APLs even without formal accession, could bridge gaps. Second, addressing withdrawals requires a balanced approach—acknowledging security concerns while reinforcing the humanitarian imperatives of the treaty. Regional dialogues, especially in Europe amid the Russo-Ukrainian War, could mitigate fears driving states to reconsider commitments.
Third, funding mechanisms for mine clearance and victim assistance must be strengthened. A dedicated multilateral fund, supported by states parties under Article 6, could ensure sustained resources for affected regions. Fourth, enforcement against non-state actors using mines or improvised devices requires enhanced cooperation with international criminal justice mechanisms, ensuring accountability beyond state-centric frameworks.
Legally, states must streamline treaty incorporation, whether through monist or dualist systems. Capacity-building for legislative and administrative alignment with Article 9 obligations can accelerate compliance. Finally, leveraging the VCLT framework, states should promote treaty education and legal training to ensure proper entry and adherence to international agreements like the Ottawa Convention, fostering a culture of rule-based engagement.
Conclusion
The Ottawa Convention stands as a testament to the international community’s capacity to address humanitarian crises through legal and normative innovation. Its impact is evident in the millions of mines destroyed, land cleared, and lives saved or rebuilt through victim assistance. Yet, the challenges of non-participation, geopolitical tensions, and resource limitations highlight the unfinished nature of this mission. Legally, the treaty provides accessible mechanisms for entry, adaptable to diverse national systems of treaty incorporation, while its alignment with VCLT principles offers a blueprint for state engagement in international law.
As the world navigates emerging security dilemmas, the Ottawa Convention’s relevance remains undiminished. Sustained commitment from states, supported by robust legal frameworks and international cooperation, is essential to realizing a mine-free world—a goal that, while distant, remains within reach through collective action and adherence to shared humanitarian values.
References
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), opened for signature 3 December 1997, entered into force 1 March 1999, 2056 UNTS 211.
- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331.
- Arms Control Association. (2022). The Ottawa Convention at a Glance. Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ottawa-convention-glance.
- Arms Control Association. (2025). The Ottawa Convention: Signatories and States-Parties. Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ottawa-convention-signatories-and-states-parties.
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (2025). Frequently Asked Questions: Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/article/FAQ-anti-personnel-mine-ban-convention-ottawa-treaty.
- Lieber Institute West Point. (2025). Assessing the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Mine Convention Withdrawals. Available at: https://lieber.westpoint.edu/assessing-ottawa-anti-personnel-mine-convention-withdrawals/.
- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). (n.d.). Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention. Available at: https://disarmament.unoda.org/anti-personnel-landmines-convention/.
