Introduction
Burundi, a small landlocked country in East Africa, has a complex history shaped by internal conflict, political transitions, and regional dynamics. As a member of the international community, Burundi participates in global and regional treaties to address issues ranging from peace and security to economic cooperation and human rights. The treaty-making process in Burundi is governed by its constitutional framework, which outlines the legal procedures and institutions responsible for entering into international agreements. This article explores Burundi’s treaty-making process, focusing on the constitutional provisions that regulate this activity, the country’s approach to the integration of international law into its domestic legal system, and its relationship with key international legal instruments such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969. By analyzing these elements, this article aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how Burundi engages with international commitments and what this implies for other states seeking to enter into treaties with the country.
The structure of this article proceeds as follows: first, it examines the constitutional framework for treaty-making in Burundi, with specific reference to the relevant articles of the 2018 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi. Second, it assesses whether Burundi adopts a monist or dualist approach to the relationship between international and domestic law, and how treaties are integrated into the national legal system. Third, it investigates Burundi’s status as a party to the VCLT of 1969 and discusses the implications of this status for treaty-making practices with other countries. Finally, the article offers reflections on the broader challenges and opportunities in Burundi’s engagement with international law.
Constitutional Framework for Treaty-Making in Burundi
The legal basis for Burundi’s treaty-making process is embedded in its constitutional framework, specifically the 2018 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi, which serves as the supreme law of the land. This document, adopted following a controversial referendum in May 2018, provides the foundational principles and procedures for entering into international agreements. The Constitution delineates the roles of various state organs in the treaty-making process, ensuring that international commitments are undertaken with appropriate checks and balances to safeguard national sovereignty and interests.
Article 289 of the 2018 Constitution is central to understanding Burundi’s treaty-making authority. It stipulates that the President of the Republic has the power to negotiate and ratify international treaties and agreements. This provision establishes the President as the primary representative of the state in international affairs, reflecting a common practice in many presidential systems where the executive holds significant authority over foreign relations. However, the Constitution also introduces a critical role for the Parliament to ensure democratic oversight. Article 289 further provides that certain categories of treaties cannot be ratified without the approval of the Parliament, particularly those related to peace treaties, defense alliances, and matters involving significant changes to national legislation or sovereignty.
Moreover, Article 290 of the Constitution specifies that treaties concerning the status of persons, such as those related to human rights or refugee protection, must also be submitted to the Parliament for approval before ratification. This provision reflects a commitment to ensuring that international obligations affecting the rights and duties of individuals are subject to broader scrutiny and debate within the legislative branch. Additionally, Article 169 emphasizes the role of the National Assembly and the Senate in maintaining checks and balances, requiring that both chambers of Parliament approve treaties that have implications for national law or policy by an absolute majority.
The inclusion of parliamentary approval in the treaty-making process is significant for several reasons. First, it ensures that international commitments are not solely the prerogative of the executive branch but are subject to democratic deliberation. Second, it aligns with principles of transparency and accountability, as elected representatives have the opportunity to debate the implications of treaties on national interests. However, the practical implementation of these constitutional provisions has often been challenged by political instability and the concentration of power in the executive, particularly during periods of crisis in Burundi’s recent history.
Another key aspect of the constitutional framework is the principle of pacta sunt servanda, implicitly recognized in Burundi’s legal system through its commitment to honor international obligations. While not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, this principle is inferred from Article 293, which states that duly ratified treaties have the force of law within the national territory. This article forms the basis for understanding how international commitments are integrated into the domestic legal order, a topic that will be explored in greater detail in the following section.
In practice, the treaty-making process in Burundi involves several stages: negotiation, signature, parliamentary approval (where required), ratification, and publication. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs typically plays a facilitating role in negotiations, advising the President on matters of international law and diplomacy. Once a treaty is signed, the text is submitted to the Council of Ministers for review before being forwarded to Parliament if legislative approval is necessary. Upon ratification by the President, the treaty is published in the Official Gazette of Burundi, marking its formal entry into force within the national legal system.
Monist or Dualist Approach: Integration of Treaties into National Law
A critical dimension of Burundi’s engagement with international law is the relationship between international treaties and domestic law, often conceptualized through the monist and dualist theoretical frameworks. In a monist system, international law and domestic law form a single legal order, with international norms automatically becoming part of national law upon ratification. In contrast, a dualist system views international and domestic law as separate, requiring specific legislative action to incorporate international treaties into the national legal framework.
Burundi adopts a predominantly monist approach to the integration of international law, as evidenced by Article 293 of the 2018 Constitution. This article provides that international treaties and agreements, once duly ratified and published, have the force of law in the national territory. This provision implies that ratified treaties do not require additional legislative action to be enforceable within Burundi’s legal system, aligning with the monist perspective where international law is directly applicable upon ratification. Furthermore, Article 19 of the Constitution incorporates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other fundamental international instruments into the national legal order, reinforcing the monist orientation by prioritizing certain international norms within the domestic hierarchy of laws.
However, while Burundi’s constitutional framework leans toward monism, elements of dualism are also present in practice, creating a hybrid system. For instance, treaties that necessitate changes to existing national legislation or the adoption of new laws often require Parliament to enact implementing legislation. This requirement reflects a dualist element, as the direct application of a treaty may be contingent upon legislative harmonization. An example of this can be seen in Burundi’s implementation of regional agreements under the East African Community (EAC), where domestic laws have been adapted to align with treaty obligations on trade and economic integration.
The monist inclination in Burundi’s legal system is further supported by the judiciary’s role in interpreting and enforcing international law. The Constitutional Court, established under Article 228 of the Constitution, has the mandate to ensure that national laws and policies comply with constitutional principles, including those derived from international commitments. While there are limited records of case law explicitly addressing the direct application of treaties, the Court’s jurisdiction suggests that it could play a pivotal role in resolving conflicts between domestic law and international obligations, thereby reinforcing the monist approach.
Despite the constitutional framework favoring monism, challenges remain in the effective integration of treaties into national law. Limited institutional capacity, political instability, and a lack of public awareness about international obligations often hinder the practical enforcement of treaties. For example, Burundi’s commitments under international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), have faced implementation gaps due to systemic issues within the judiciary and law enforcement sectors. This discrepancy between constitutional provisions and practical outcomes underscores the need for stronger mechanisms to ensure that international commitments translate into tangible changes at the domestic level.
Burundi and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969 is a foundational instrument in international law, codifying customary rules governing the formation, interpretation, and termination of treaties. Adopted on May 23, 1969, and entering into force on January 27, 1980, the VCLT provides a comprehensive framework for treaty-making practices among states. Given its significance, whether Burundi is a party to the VCLT is a pertinent question for understanding the country’s approach to international agreements and for guiding other states in their treaty-making interactions with Burundi.
Burundi is not a party to the VCLT of 1969. According to the records of the United Nations Treaty Collection, Burundi has neither signed nor ratified the Convention as of the latest available data. This status means that Burundi is not formally bound by the specific provisions of the VCLT. However, it is important to note that many of the rules enshrined in the VCLT are considered reflective of customary international law, which binds all states regardless of their status as parties to the Convention. Principles such as pacta sunt servanda (treaties must be performed in good faith) and the rules on treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT are widely accepted as customary norms and thus applicable to Burundi.
The absence of formal adherence to the VCLT has several implications for Burundi’s treaty-making process. First, while Burundi is not bound by the procedural specifics of the VCLT, its treaty practices are influenced by customary international law, which mirrors many of the Convention’s provisions. For instance, Burundi’s constitutional requirement for ratification and publication of treaties aligns with the VCLT’s emphasis on formal consent and the entry into force of treaties under Articles 11 and 24. Second, the lack of formal membership in the VCLT may create uncertainties for other states engaging with Burundi, particularly in areas such as treaty interpretation or dispute resolution, where the VCLT provides clear guidelines.
For other countries seeking to enter into treaties with Burundi, the non-party status to the VCLT suggests a need for explicit agreements on procedural and interpretative rules during negotiations. States should ensure that treaty texts with Burundi include clauses on key matters such as entry into force, amendment, and termination to avoid ambiguities that might arise due to the absence of a binding reference to the VCLT. Moreover, other states should be mindful of Burundi’s domestic constitutional requirements for treaty approval and ratification, as outlined in Articles 289 and 290 of the 2018 Constitution, to ensure that agreements are legally valid under Burundian law.
Burundi’s non-party status to the VCLT also highlights a broader issue of limited engagement with certain international legal instruments, which may be attributed to historical and political factors rather than a deliberate rejection of international norms. During much of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Burundi was preoccupied with internal conflict and post-conflict recovery, which likely diverted attention from formalizing commitments to treaties like the VCLT. Encouraging Burundi to accede to the VCLT could enhance clarity and predictability in its treaty-making practices, benefiting both Burundi and its international partners.
Challenges and Opportunities in Burundi’s Treaty-Making Process
While the constitutional framework and monist-leaning approach provide a structured basis for treaty-making in Burundi, several challenges impede the effective engagement with international commitments. One major challenge is the recurring political instability that has characterized Burundi’s modern history, particularly following the 2015 political crisis triggered by the controversial re-election of President Pierre Nkurunziza. Such instability often results in a deprioritization of international obligations in favor of domestic political survival, leading to delays or inconsistencies in treaty implementation.
Another challenge lies in the institutional capacity to negotiate, ratify, and implement treaties. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant bodies often face resource constraints, limiting their ability to engage effectively in complex international negotiations or to ensure the domestication of treaty obligations through policy and legal reforms. Additionally, public awareness and civil society engagement with international treaties remain low in Burundi, reducing the pressure on the government to adhere to commitments, particularly in areas such as human rights and environmental protection.
Despite these challenges, there are significant opportunities for Burundi to strengthen its treaty-making process. Regional integration through frameworks like the East African Community (EAC) and the African Union (AU) offers platforms for Burundi to align its treaty practices with continental and regional standards. These organizations often provide technical assistance and capacity-building initiatives that can enhance Burundi’s ability to negotiate and implement international agreements. Furthermore, international partners can play a role in supporting Burundi’s adherence to global norms by offering training and resources to strengthen its legal and diplomatic institutions.
Burundi’s monist-leaning approach also presents an opportunity for the direct application of international law to address domestic issues. For instance, treaties on climate change, trade, and security could be leveraged to bring about legislative and policy reforms without the need for extensive additional legal processes, provided there is political will and institutional support. Strengthening the role of the Constitutional Court in overseeing the alignment of national laws with international obligations could further enhance the enforcement of treaties within the domestic sphere.
Implications for International Partners
For states and international organizations seeking to enter into treaties with Burundi, understanding the country’s constitutional framework and treaty-making practices is essential for ensuring the validity and effectiveness of agreements. The requirement for parliamentary approval for certain types of treaties, as stipulated in Articles 289 and 290 of the 2018 Constitution, means that international partners must account for potential delays in the ratification process, especially during periods of political gridlock or legislative recess. Engaging with both the executive and legislative branches during treaty negotiations can help streamline this process and ensure broader political buy-in.
Moreover, given Burundi’s non-party status to the VCLT of 1969, international partners should prioritize clarity in treaty texts to mitigate potential disputes over interpretation or implementation. Incorporating detailed provisions on dispute resolution mechanisms and treaty termination can provide a safeguard against uncertainties arising from the absence of a formal commitment to the VCLT’s procedural rules. Additionally, partners should support capacity-building initiatives to enhance Burundi’s treaty-making infrastructure, fostering a more predictable and reliable environment for international cooperation.
Conclusion
Burundi’s treaty-making process is deeply rooted in its 2018 Constitution, which establishes a structured yet complex framework for entering into international agreements. The President holds primary authority over treaty negotiations and ratification, while the Parliament plays a crucial role in approving significant commitments, ensuring a degree of democratic oversight. The country’s predominantly monist approach to the integration of international law, as reflected in Article 293 of the Constitution, allows for the direct application of ratified treaties within the national legal system, though elements of dualism are evident in the need for implementing legislation in certain cases.
Burundi’s non-party status to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) underscores the importance of customary international law in guiding its treaty practices, while also highlighting the need for explicit agreements on procedural matters with international partners. Despite challenges such as political instability and limited institutional capacity, opportunities exist for Burundi to strengthen its engagement with international commitments through regional integration and capacity-building initiatives. For other states, a nuanced understanding of Burundi’s legal and political context is vital for forging effective and sustainable treaty relationships.
In sum, Burundi’s treaty-making process reflects a balance between constitutional principles and practical realities, offering both challenges and potential for deeper integration into the global legal order. Future research could explore specific case studies of Burundi’s treaty implementation to provide empirical insights into the effectiveness of its legal framework and to identify targeted strategies for improvement.
References
- Constitution of the Republic of Burundi (2018). Official Gazette of Burundi.
- United Nations Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). Retrieved from United Nations online database.
- International Law Commission. (1969). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. United Nations.
- Reyntjens, F. (1993). The Crisis in Burundi: Challenges of Governance and International Law. Journal of African Law, 37(2), 123-135.
- Van der Vyver, J. D. (2010). Monism and Dualism in International Law: Implications for Treaty Implementation. South African Journal of International Affairs, 17(1), 45-60.
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