Banning the Silent Killers: The Global Impact of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty

Introduction

Anti-personnel mines (APMs), often referred to as “silent killers,” have inflicted untold suffering on civilians and combatants alike, long after conflicts have ended. These insidious devices, designed to maim rather than kill, have left a grim legacy in war-torn regions, hindering post-conflict reconstruction and claiming innocent lives. The international community’s response to this humanitarian crisis culminated in the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the Ottawa Treaty or the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty, in 1997. This landmark treaty represents a pivotal step in international humanitarian law, aiming to eliminate the scourge of APMs through a comprehensive framework of prohibitions and obligations. As of 2025, 165 states have ratified or acceded to the treaty, demonstrating significant global commitment, though major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia remain outside its fold. This article examines the global impact of the Ottawa Treaty, exploring its legal framework, implementation challenges, and broader implications for international law and humanitarian efforts. It also addresses the treaty’s relationship with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969 and the mechanisms by which states integrate treaty obligations into national law, using a hypothetical state as a case study to illustrate these processes.

The Legal Framework of the Ottawa Treaty

The Ottawa Treaty, signed on December 3, 1997, in Ottawa, Canada, and entering into force on March 1, 1999, establishes a comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines. Its preamble underscores the “determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines,” reflecting a shared humanitarian objective among state parties. The treaty’s key provisions are articulated in several articles that collectively prohibit the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of APMs, as well as mandating their destruction and the clearance of mined areas.

Article 1 of the Convention outlines the general obligations, stating that each state party “undertakes never under any circumstances” to use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, or transfer APMs, directly or indirectly. This absolute prohibition is a cornerstone of the treaty, leaving no room for exceptions, even in times of war. Article 4 requires state parties to destroy their stockpiled APMs within four years of the treaty’s entry into force for that state, while Article 5 mandates the clearance of all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within ten years, with provisions for extensions if necessary. Additionally, Article 6 addresses international cooperation and assistance, encouraging state parties to support mine clearance and victim assistance programs in affected regions (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1997).

The treaty also establishes mechanisms for transparency and compliance. Under Article 7, state parties must submit annual reports detailing their progress in implementing the treaty, including stockpile destruction and mine clearance efforts. Article 8 provides for “facilitation and clarification of compliance,” allowing state parties to raise concerns about non-compliance through diplomatic channels or meetings of state parties. These provisions reflect the treaty’s emphasis on accountability and collective responsibility to achieve a mine-free world.

Global Impact of the Ottawa Treaty

Since its inception, the Ottawa Treaty has had a profound impact on global efforts to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of APMs. One of its most significant achievements is the reduction in the production and use of these weapons. According to reports from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the global production of APMs has virtually ceased among state parties, and over 55 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed as of 2023. Furthermore, the treaty has facilitated extensive mine clearance operations, with millions of square meters of land rendered safe for civilian use in countries such as Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan (ICBL, 2023).

Beyond its tangible outcomes, the treaty has also shifted international norms surrounding the use of APMs. It has stigmatized the weapon, creating a moral and political barrier even for non-signatory states. For instance, while the United States is not a party to the treaty, it has adhered to a self-imposed ban on the use of APMs since 2014, except in specific circumstances on the Korean Peninsula. This demonstrates the treaty’s normative influence, which extends beyond its legal obligations (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

However, challenges remain. The refusal of major military powers such as China, Russia, and India to join the treaty limits its universal applicability. Recent developments, including the withdrawal of several European countries (e.g., Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland) in 2025, as well as Ukraine’s announced intent to suspend participation amid the Russo-Ukrainian War, underscore the tension between security concerns and humanitarian commitments. These withdrawals highlight the treaty’s vulnerability in the face of geopolitical instability and the need for sustained diplomatic efforts to maintain its relevance (CBC News, 2025).

Another critical impact of the treaty is its contribution to victim assistance. Article 6 emphasizes the importance of providing support to mine victims, including medical care, rehabilitation, and social reintegration. This provision has spurred international funding and programs aimed at addressing the long-term needs of survivors, particularly in heavily affected regions. Nonetheless, funding shortfalls and uneven implementation across state parties remain persistent barriers to fulfilling this obligation (ICRC, 2021).

Legal Mechanisms for Treaty Accession and Implementation

To understand how a state can legally enter into treaties such as the Ottawa Treaty, it is necessary to examine the provisions of international law as well as the internal legal framework of the state in question. Since this article discusses a hypothetical state, let us consider a generic state referred to as “State X” to illustrate the process. The Ottawa Treaty itself does not specify the internal constitutional mechanisms by which a state may accede to or ratify it, as this falls under the purview of each state’s domestic legal system. However, Article 9 of the treaty stipulates that it is open for signature by all states and that ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession is required for a state to become bound by its provisions. Instruments of ratification or accession must be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the treaty’s depositary (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1997).

Under international law, the capacity of a state to enter into treaties is governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969, which serves as the foundational framework for treaty-making. Article 6 of the VCLT affirms that every state possesses the capacity to conclude treaties, while Articles 11 to 15 outline the means by which states express consent to be bound, including signature, ratification, and accession (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969). For State X, the ability to join the Ottawa Treaty would depend on compliance with these international norms as well as its own constitutional processes.

Assuming State X operates under a constitutional framework similar to many modern states, its process for entering into treaties might involve both executive and legislative branches. For instance, the executive (e.g., the head of state or government) may negotiate and sign the treaty, while the legislature provides approval for ratification. Once ratified, the treaty’s entry into force for State X would occur six months after the deposit of its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General, as stipulated in Article 17 of the Ottawa Treaty (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1997).

Monist vs. Dualist Approaches to Treaty Implementation

A critical aspect of treaty implementation is whether a state follows a monist or dualist approach to the relationship between international and domestic law. In a monist system, international treaties automatically become part of domestic law upon ratification, without the need for additional legislative action. In contrast, a dualist system requires explicit incorporation of treaty obligations into national law through domestic legislation before they can be enforced domestically.

For the purposes of this analysis, let us assume State X operates under a dualist system, as is common in many common law jurisdictions. In such a system, the ratification of the Ottawa Treaty by State X would not automatically render its provisions enforceable in domestic courts. Instead, State X would need to enact specific legislation to criminalize the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of APMs, as well as to establish mechanisms for stockpile destruction and mine clearance in accordance with Articles 1, 4, and 5 of the treaty. This process might involve passing a comprehensive anti-personnel mine ban act that mirrors the treaty’s obligations and provides penalties for non-compliance. Additionally, State X would likely establish a national authority or agency responsible for overseeing implementation, reporting progress under Article 7, and coordinating international assistance under Article 6 (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1997).

The dualist approach often results in delays or discrepancies between international commitments and domestic enforcement, as legislative processes can be time-consuming and subject to political opposition. In contrast, a monist state would integrate the treaty directly into its legal system upon ratification, though practical implementation (e.g., funding and enforcement mechanisms) might still lag. The choice between monist and dualist systems reflects a state’s constitutional traditions and priorities regarding the balance between international obligations and national sovereignty (Cassese, 2005).

Relationship with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)

The Ottawa Treaty, as an international agreement, operates within the framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969, which codifies customary international law on the formation, interpretation, and termination of treaties. While the Ottawa Treaty does not explicitly reference the VCLT, its drafting and implementation are implicitly guided by VCLT principles. For instance, the rules on treaty ratification, entry into force, and reservations articulated in Articles 11, 24, and 19-23 of the VCLT apply to the Ottawa Treaty by virtue of customary international law, even for states that are not parties to the VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969).

It should be clarified that the Ottawa Treaty itself is not a “party” to the VCLT, as treaties do not have legal personality to accede to other treaties. Rather, the state parties to the Ottawa Treaty are subject to the VCLT if they have ratified it or if they recognize its provisions as customary international law. As of 2025, 116 states are parties to the VCLT, meaning that many Ottawa Treaty signatories are also bound by the VCLT’s rules. For non-VCLT states, customary international law still governs their treaty-making processes, ensuring that the principles of pacta sunt servanda (treaties must be observed in good faith, as per Article 26 of the VCLT) and rebus sic stantibus (fundamental change of circumstances, as per Article 62) remain applicable (Brownlie, 2008).

The relationship between the Ottawa Treaty and the VCLT provides important guidance for states on how to properly enter into treaties. First, states must ensure that their representatives have the full powers to negotiate and sign treaties, as required by Article 7 of the VCLT. Second, states should avoid making reservations to the Ottawa Treaty that are incompatible with its object and purpose, as prohibited by Article 19 of the VCLT. Notably, the Ottawa Treaty itself does not permit reservations under Article 19 of its text, reinforcing its goal of uniform application (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1997). Third, states must adhere to the principle of good faith in implementing their obligations, ensuring that domestic laws and policies align with the treaty’s objectives. For non-signatory states considering accession, the VCLT framework offers a roadmap for lawful and effective treaty engagement, emphasizing transparency and accountability in the process.

Challenges and Future Prospects

Despite its successes, the Ottawa Treaty faces several challenges that threaten its long-term efficacy. The most pressing issue is the non-participation of key states with significant military capabilities and historical use of APMs. Without universal adherence, the treaty’s goal of a mine-free world remains elusive. Moreover, recent geopolitical tensions, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, have led to increased use of APMs by non-signatory states and even prompted withdrawals by state parties, as noted earlier. This underscores the need for stronger mechanisms to address security concerns without undermining humanitarian principles (Balkan Insight, 2025).

Another challenge lies in the area of compliance and enforcement. While the treaty’s transparency measures and compliance mechanisms (Articles 7 and 8) are robust on paper, their effectiveness depends on state willingness to self-report and address violations. The lack of a binding enforcement body means that non-compliance often goes unpunished, relying instead on diplomatic pressure and civil society advocacy to encourage adherence (ICBL, 2023).

Looking ahead, the future of the Ottawa Treaty hinges on sustained international cooperation and innovative approaches to addressing emerging threats. The rise of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that function as APMs, poses a new frontier for the treaty’s scope. While the treaty applies only to state parties, extending its principles to counter non-state actors will require collaboration with international organizations and local governments in conflict zones. Additionally, increased funding for mine clearance and victim assistance, particularly in under-resourced regions, is crucial to fulfilling the treaty’s humanitarian mandate (ICRC, 2021).

Conclusion

The Ottawa Treaty stands as a testament to the international community’s commitment to eradicating the silent killers that are anti-personnel mines. Through its comprehensive legal framework, it has saved countless lives, facilitated post-conflict recovery, and reshaped global norms surrounding the use of inhumane weapons. However, its impact is tempered by persistent challenges, including non-universal adherence, geopolitical tensions, and implementation gaps. The treaty’s interaction with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 provides a critical foundation for understanding how states can and should engage with such agreements, emphasizing the importance of good faith and domestic alignment with international obligations. Using the case of a hypothetical State X, this article has illustrated the complexities of treaty accession and implementation in dualist systems, highlighting the need for robust national legislation to translate commitments into action. As the world grapples with new security challenges and humanitarian crises, the Ottawa Treaty’s relevance remains undeniable, but its success will depend on renewed political will, enhanced cooperation, and adaptation to evolving threats. Only through collective effort can the vision of a mine-free world be fully realized.

References

• Balkan Insight. (2025). Anti-Personnel Mines Look Set to Return on Europe’s Eastern Flank. Retrieved from available online sources.
• Brownlie, I. (2008). Principles of Public International Law (7th ed.). Oxford University Press.
• Cassese, A. (2005). International Law (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
• CBC News. (2025). Ukraine on Track to Withdraw from Ottawa Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Mines. Retrieved from available online sources.
• Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. (1997). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2056, p. 211.
• International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (2023). Landmine Monitor 2023. Retrieved from available online sources.
• International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (2021). 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Retrieved from available online sources.
• U.S. Department of State. (2020). U.S. Policy on Landmines. Retrieved from available online sources.
• Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. (1969). United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331.