Abstract
This article examines Armenia’s treaty-making process within the context of its constitutional framework and international commitments. It provides a detailed analysis of the legal mechanisms through which Armenia enters into international treaties, focusing on the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia. The study also explores whether Armenia adheres to a monist or dualist approach in incorporating international treaties into its national legal system and the practical implications of this stance. Furthermore, it investigates Armenia’s relationship with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969 and discusses how this status informs other states in their treaty negotiations with Armenia. By synthesizing constitutional texts, legal practices, and international obligations, the article contributes to a broader understanding of Armenia’s role in international law and diplomacy.
Introduction
International treaties serve as fundamental instruments for fostering cooperation, resolving conflicts, and establishing legal norms among sovereign states. For a state like Armenia, a nation with a complex geopolitical history and strategic regional positioning, the process of treaty-making is not merely a procedural formality but a critical component of its foreign policy and legal identity. This article seeks to elucidate the constitutional framework governing Armenia’s treaty-making process, its approach to integrating international law into domestic legislation, and its engagement with foundational international legal instruments such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969.
Armenia, having gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, has since developed a legal system that reflects both its historical legacies and modern aspirations as a democratic state. The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, adopted in 1995 and significantly amended in 2005 and 2015, provides the bedrock for its engagement in international agreements. This article first examines the specific constitutional provisions related to treaty-making, highlighting the roles of key state institutions. It then addresses the conceptual debate surrounding monist and dualist approaches to international law, situating Armenia within this spectrum. Finally, it considers Armenia’s status vis-à-vis the VCLT and the implications for other states engaging with Armenia on the international stage. Through this comprehensive analysis, the article aims to offer insights into how Armenia navigates the intersection of domestic law and international commitments.
Constitutional Framework for Treaty-Making in Armenia
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia establishes a clear legal framework for the negotiation, conclusion, and ratification of international treaties, delineating the roles and responsibilities of state organs in this process. The Constitution, as the supreme legal document, ensures that treaty-making aligns with national interests while respecting international legal norms. The key provisions relevant to this process are found in Chapter 6, which deals with the President of the Republic, and Chapter 7, which addresses the powers of the National Assembly, as well as other pertinent articles related to the judiciary and international relations.
Article 55 of the Constitution, prior to amendments, vested significant authority in the President to conduct foreign policy, including the power to conclude international treaties. However, following the 2015 constitutional reforms, which transformed Armenia into a parliamentary republic, the President’s role became more ceremonial, with executive powers largely transferred to the Prime Minister. Despite this shift, Article 129 of the amended Constitution still assigns the President the role of representing Armenia in international relations and signing ratification instruments for treaties upon the recommendation of the Government. This indicates a symbolic yet significant involvement in the treaty-making process.
More critically, Article 116 of the Constitution empowers the National Assembly, Armenia’s legislative body, to ratify, suspend, or denounce international treaties. Specifically, Article 116(1) states that the National Assembly ratifies treaties that entail changes to Armenian law, establish political or military commitments, or involve financial obligations. This provision underscores the importance of parliamentary oversight in ensuring that international agreements align with domestic legal and policy priorities. The requirement for ratification by the National Assembly reflects a democratic check on executive actions in foreign affairs, ensuring broader political consensus.
Additionally, Article 5 of the Constitution establishes the principle of the rule of law and the separation of powers, which indirectly influences treaty-making by mandating that all state actions, including those in the international sphere, conform to constitutional principles. Article 6 further stipulates that international treaties ratified by Armenia constitute an integral part of the legal system, a point that will be elaborated upon in the discussion of monist and dualist approaches.
The process of entering into a treaty in Armenia typically involves several stages: negotiation, signing, and ratification. Negotiations are generally conducted by the Government, often through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the strategic guidance of the Prime Minister. Once an agreement is reached, the treaty is signed, often by the President or a designated representative, signaling Armenia’s intent to be bound by the agreement subject to ratification. Ratification, as mandated by Article 116, is the critical step that legally binds Armenia under international law, following a review and approval by the National Assembly. In cases where a treaty may conflict with the Constitution, Article 169 requires that the Constitutional Court evaluate its compatibility with constitutional norms before ratification, ensuring legal coherence.
This constitutional framework demonstrates a collaborative approach to treaty-making in Armenia, involving the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It reflects a commitment to balancing national sovereignty with international engagement, ensuring that treaties are not only strategically beneficial but also legally sound within the domestic context.
Monist or Dualist Approach: Armenia’s Position on International Law
The relationship between international law and domestic law is a central issue in legal theory, often framed within the monist-dualist dichotomy. Monist systems view international law and national law as part of a single legal order, where international treaties can have direct effect in domestic courts upon ratification. In contrast, dualist systems treat the two as separate, requiring specific legislative action to incorporate international obligations into national law.
Armenia’s approach to this dichotomy is explicitly addressed in its Constitution. Article 6 states, “International treaties ratified by the Republic of Armenia shall be an integral part of the legal system of the Republic of Armenia. If a ratified international treaty stipulates norms other than those stipulated in the laws, the norms of the treaty shall prevail.” This provision clearly indicates a monist orientation, as ratified treaties are automatically integrated into the national legal system and can take precedence over conflicting domestic laws. This constitutional stance simplifies the implementation of international commitments by eliminating the need for separate legislative acts to domesticate treaty obligations, provided they have been duly ratified by the National Assembly.
However, while Armenia’s Constitution leans towards monism, practical implementation reveals nuances that suggest a hybrid approach in certain contexts. For instance, while Article 6 establishes the direct applicability of ratified treaties, the judiciary’s interpretation and enforcement of these norms can sometimes require additional regulatory or legislative measures to ensure effective application. This is particularly relevant for complex treaties that necessitate detailed domestic frameworks for enforcement, such as those related to human rights or environmental standards. Courts, guided by Article 7 of the Constitution, which mandates adherence to international human rights norms, often play a pivotal role in interpreting and applying treaty provisions, but the lack of specific implementing legislation can lead to inconsistencies.
Moreover, the Constitutional Court of Armenia, as per Article 169, has the authority to review the constitutionality of international treaties prior to ratification. If a treaty is found to contradict constitutional provisions, it cannot be ratified unless the Constitution is amended or the treaty is renegotiated. This pre-ratification review mechanism serves as a dualist safeguard, ensuring that international commitments do not undermine fundamental domestic legal principles unless explicitly sanctioned through constitutional reform.
In practice, Armenia’s monist inclination facilitates prompt alignment with international obligations, particularly in areas such as human rights, where treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights have been directly invoked in Armenian courts following ratification. However, the necessity for judicial and occasionally legislative action to fully operationalize certain treaty provisions suggests that elements of dualism persist in the Armenian legal system. This hybrid approach reflects the tension between theoretical commitment to monism and the practical necessities of governance in a state with evolving legal and institutional capacities.
Implementation of Treaties into National Law
As established, Armenia’s monist orientation under Article 6 of the Constitution allows ratified international treaties to become part of the national legal system without the need for additional legislative enactment. This direct incorporation means that treaties, once ratified, can potentially be invoked in domestic courts and applied by administrative bodies. This section examines the mechanisms and challenges associated with translating international commitments into effective national law in Armenia.
The primary mechanism for treaty implementation is the ratification process itself, conducted by the National Assembly under Article 116. Upon ratification, a treaty is published in the Official Gazette, rendering it legally binding within the domestic sphere. This publication serves as formal notification to all state entities and citizens of the new legal obligations. For treaties that do not require changes to existing legislation—because they do not conflict with domestic law or because they operate at a level of generality that does not demand specific implementation—the direct applicability principle of Article 6 suffices for enforcement.
However, many treaties, especially those concerning economic cooperation, trade, or specific regulatory standards, require detailed domestic legislation to give effect to their provisions. In such cases, the Government proposes draft laws to the National Assembly to align national legislation with treaty obligations. For example, Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) necessitated numerous legislative amendments to harmonize domestic laws with EAEU regulations, demonstrating a proactive approach to treaty implementation even within a monist framework.
Challenges in implementation often arise due to institutional capacity, legal interpretation, and resource constraints. The judiciary, while empowered to apply international norms directly, may lack adequate training or precedent to consistently interpret treaty provisions in line with international standards. Furthermore, administrative bodies responsible for enforcement may face bureaucratic delays or funding shortages, hindering effective compliance with treaty obligations. These practical difficulties highlight the limitations of a purely monist approach in the absence of robust institutional support.
Another critical aspect of treaty implementation in Armenia is the role of the Constitutional Court. As previously noted, the Court’s pre-ratification review under Article 169 ensures that treaties do not contravene constitutional principles. Post-ratification, the Court can also adjudicate disputes arising from the application of treaty norms, providing a judicial mechanism to resolve conflicts between international and domestic law. This dual role of the Court reinforces the integration of international commitments while safeguarding national legal integrity.
Armenia and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969 is widely regarded as the authoritative framework for the formation, interpretation, and termination of international treaties (United Nations, 1969). Often described as the “treaty on treaties,” the VCLT codifies customary international law and provides a universal standard for state conduct in treaty-making. This section assesses Armenia’s status concerning the VCLT and the implications for other states entering into treaties with Armenia.
Armenia acceded to the VCLT on May 9, 1990, during the final years of Soviet rule, with the accession becoming effective for the independent Republic of Armenia following its independence in 1991. As a party to the VCLT, Armenia is legally bound by its provisions, which govern aspects such as treaty negotiation, entry into force, reservations, and termination. The VCLT’s principles, including pacta sunt servanda (treaties must be observed in good faith) under Article 26 and the rules on treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32, underpin Armenia’s approach to international agreements.
Armenia’s adherence to the VCLT signals to other states a commitment to internationally recognized norms in treaty-making. For instance, when negotiating bilateral or multilateral agreements, Armenia is expected to adhere to VCLT standards regarding the expression of consent to be bound (Article 11) and the avoidance of treaties concluded under coercion or fraud (Articles 49-52). This provides a predictable legal framework for other countries engaging with Armenia, reducing uncertainties in diplomatic and legal interactions.
For states that are also parties to the VCLT, treaty-making with Armenia operates within a shared legal paradigm, facilitating smoother negotiations and dispute resolution. Even for non-parties to the VCLT, many of its provisions are considered customary international law, as acknowledged in legal scholarship and state practice (Sinclair, 1984), meaning that Armenia’s treaty-making behavior remains aligned with widely accepted global standards. However, other states must remain cognizant of Armenia’s domestic constitutional requirements, particularly the need for National Assembly ratification under Article 116 and potential Constitutional Court review under Article 169, which may affect the timeline and conditions for treaty entry into force.
Armenia’s status as a VCLT party also informs its approach to treaty reservations and declarations. Under VCLT Article 19, states may formulate reservations unless prohibited by the treaty or contrary to its object and purpose. Armenia has utilized this provision in certain treaties to protect national interests, and other states should anticipate such reservations during negotiations. Moreover, Armenia’s monist legal system, combined with VCLT compliance, means that ratified treaties are likely to be directly enforceable domestically, providing assurance to treaty partners of Armenia’s commitment to implementation, subject to the practical challenges discussed earlier.
Implications for International Partners
Understanding Armenia’s treaty-making process and its alignment with the VCLT offers valuable guidance for states and international organizations seeking to establish legal agreements with Armenia. The constitutional emphasis on parliamentary ratification and judicial review suggests that treaty negotiations may require patience and attention to Armenia’s domestic political and legal dynamics. For instance, treaties with significant political, military, or financial implications are subject to rigorous scrutiny by the National Assembly, and potential constitutional challenges could delay ratification.
Additionally, Armenia’s monist approach, tempered by practical dualist tendencies, implies that while treaties are theoretically directly applicable, their effective implementation may depend on supporting domestic legislation or judicial interpretation. International partners should therefore consider engaging with Armenian authorities to ensure that necessary implementing mechanisms are in place, particularly for complex agreements requiring administrative or regulatory frameworks.
Armenia’s commitment to the VCLT further assures partners of a rules-based approach to treaty-making. States can rely on Armenia’s adherence to good faith principles and standardized treaty procedures, which enhances trust in bilateral and multilateral engagements. However, awareness of specific national procedures, such as pre-ratification constitutional review, remains essential for avoiding legal or procedural missteps.
Conclusion
Armenia’s treaty-making process is deeply rooted in its constitutional framework, which balances executive initiative with legislative and judicial oversight to ensure that international commitments reflect national interests and legal principles. The Constitution, particularly through Articles 6, 116, and 169, establishes a robust mechanism for entering into treaties, underpinned by a predominantly monist approach that integrates ratified treaties directly into the national legal system. However, practical challenges and occasional reliance on implementing legislation reveal elements of dualism, highlighting the complexities of aligning international obligations with domestic capacities.
As a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, Armenia adheres to globally recognized standards in treaty formation and implementation, providing a predictable legal environment for international partners. This commitment, combined with its constitutional safeguards, informs other states on the procedural and substantive considerations necessary for successful treaty-making with Armenia. Future research could explore the effectiveness of treaty implementation across specific sectors in Armenia, offering deeper insights into how constitutional theory translates into practical governance in the international arena.
References
- Constitution of the Republic of Armenia. (1995, as amended in 2005 and 2015). Official Gazette of the Republic of Armenia.
- Sinclair, I. (1984). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd ed.). Manchester University Press.
- United Nations. (1969). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331.
