Welcome to OSTL: The Organization for the Study of Treaty Law

Organization for the Study of Treaty Law

An International Association of Scholars, Diplomats and Institutions

Addressing the Global Threat: Challenges in Enforcing the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty

Introduction

The global proliferation of anti-personnel mines (APMs) has long been recognized as a humanitarian crisis, posing severe risks to civilian populations during and after conflicts. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT) or Ottawa Treaty, represents a landmark effort to address this threat. Adopted in 1997 and entering into force in 1999, the treaty seeks to eliminate the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of APMs, while also mandating the destruction of existing stockpiles and clearance of mined areas. Despite its widespread acceptance, with over 160 States Parties, enforcing the APMBT faces significant challenges ranging from non-compliance by key states to practical difficulties in implementation and monitoring. This article explores these enforcement challenges, situating them within the broader framework of international law and treaty compliance. Additionally, it examines the legal mechanisms for treaty adoption in the hypothetical country of “Erewhon,” including its approach to international treaties (monist or dualist), and its relationship with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969 as a guide for other nations in engaging with Erewhon on treaty matters, particularly concerning the APMBT.

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty: Objectives and Scope

The APMBT is a cornerstone of international humanitarian law, designed to mitigate the devastating impact of APMs on civilian populations. Under Article 1 of the treaty, States Parties commit to never using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, or transferring APMs under any circumstances (United Nations, 1997). Additionally, States are obligated to destroy existing stockpiles within four years of ratification (Article 4) and to clear mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within ten years (Article 5). The treaty also includes provisions for international cooperation and assistance (Article 6) to support affected states in meeting these obligations. According to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the treaty has led to the destruction of over 55 million stockpiled mines and the clearance of vast areas of land, significantly reducing civilian casualties (UNODA, n.d.).

Despite these achievements, the treaty’s effectiveness is hampered by several structural and operational challenges. The following sections delve into key enforcement issues, including non-ratification by major powers, ongoing use of APMs by non-parties and non-state actors, inadequate funding for demining, and weak monitoring mechanisms.

Challenges in Enforcing the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty

1. Non-Ratification by Major Powers

One of the most significant barriers to the universalization of the APMBT is the refusal of several major military powers to ratify the treaty. Countries such as the United States, China, Russia, India, and Pakistan, which collectively possess significant stockpiles of APMs, remain outside the treaty framework. For instance, the United States has cited national security concerns, particularly regarding the defense of the Korean Demilitarized Zone, as a reason for abstaining (CNA, 2024). This non-participation undermines the treaty’s normative power and creates a fragmented international regime where APMs continue to be produced and deployed by non-parties. As noted by Mines Action Canada, the absence of these key players limits the treaty’s ability to achieve a complete global ban (Mines Action Canada, cited in Wikipedia, 2025).

2. Use by Non-State Actors and Non-Parties

The APMBT’s scope is limited to States Parties, meaning it has no direct jurisdiction over non-state actors such as armed rebel groups or terrorist organizations. Reports indicate that non-state actors in conflict zones like Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan continue to use improvised explosive devices and APMs, often targeting civilians (ICRC, 2021). Additionally, non-party states engaged in active conflicts have been documented using APMs, further exacerbating humanitarian crises. For example, recent developments in Ukraine, where the government temporarily suspended participation in the APMBT due to battlefield setbacks against Russia, highlight the tension between security imperatives and treaty obligations (Reuters, 2025). This trend of withdrawal or non-compliance, also seen in discussions within the German parliament and other European countries, threatens the treaty’s credibility (Militarnyi, 2025; House of Commons Library, 2025).

3. Resource Constraints for Demining and Victim Assistance

Implementing the APMBT requires significant financial and technical resources, particularly for mine clearance and victim assistance. Many affected countries, especially in the Global South, lack the capacity to meet the treaty’s deadlines for clearing mined areas. Article 5 mandates a ten-year timeline for clearance, yet numerous States Parties have requested extensions due to funding shortages and technical challenges (AP Mine Ban Convention, 2024). International cooperation under Article 6 is often insufficient, with donor fatigue and competing global priorities limiting aid. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has emphasized that without sustained financial support, the humanitarian goals of the treaty remain elusive (ICRC, 2025).

4. Weak Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanisms

The APMBT lacks a robust enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance. While States Parties are required to submit annual transparency reports under Article 7, there is no mandatory verification process or sanctions for non-compliance. The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) provides technical assistance but has no punitive authority. This gap allows for potential violations to go unaddressed, as seen in cases where States Parties have been accused of failing to report stockpile destruction accurately (Lieber Institute, 2025). Strengthening monitoring through independent verification or linkages with other international bodies, such as the United Nations Security Council, could enhance accountability.

Treaty Adoption and Implementation in Erewhon: A Case Study

To contextualize the enforcement challenges of the APMBT within national legal systems, this section examines the hypothetical country of Erewhon and its approach to international treaties. As a case study, Erewhon provides insight into how domestic legal frameworks intersect with global obligations, particularly regarding the APMBT and other significant United Nations treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).

Legal Framework for Treaty Adoption in Erewhon

Erewhon’s constitution outlines a structured process for entering into international treaties, ensuring alignment with national interests and legal principles. Under Article 54 of the Erewhon Constitution, the executive branch, led by the President, has the authority to negotiate and sign treaties. However, ratification requires parliamentary approval by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, reflecting a democratic check on executive power. This provision applies to all international agreements, including the APMBT, ICESCR, Genocide Convention, CBD, and CITES. Article 55 further stipulates that treaties must be published in the national gazette to have legal effect, ensuring transparency and public awareness (Erewhon Constitution, Hypothetical Text).

Moreover, Article 56 of the Erewhon Constitution mandates that treaties touching on fundamental rights, national sovereignty, or significant financial obligations must be subjected to a public referendum if deemed necessary by the Constitutional Court. This additional layer of scrutiny ensures that treaties like the APMBT, which involve disarmament and humanitarian commitments, are broadly supported by the populace before binding the state. This constitutional framework demonstrates Erewhon’s commitment to balancing international obligations with domestic priorities.

Monist or Dualist Approach to Treaties

Erewhon adopts a dualist approach to international treaties, meaning that international law and domestic law operate as distinct legal systems. Under this framework, treaties do not automatically become part of national law upon ratification. Instead, they must be incorporated through specific legislation enacted by the National Assembly. Article 57 of the Erewhon Constitution explicitly states that “international treaties shall have no force of law within the territory of Erewhon unless transformed into national legislation through an Act of Parliament” (Erewhon Constitution, Hypothetical Text). This dualist stance contrasts with monist systems, where ratified treaties may directly apply without further legislative action.

For the APMBT, this means that even after ratification, Erewhon would need to pass domestic laws to prohibit the use, stockpiling, and production of APMs, as well as to establish mechanisms for stockpile destruction and mine clearance. Similarly, obligations under the ICESCR, Genocide Convention, CBD, and CITES would require enabling legislation to translate treaty commitments into actionable domestic policies. For instance, implementing CITES might involve laws regulating wildlife trade, while the Genocide Convention would necessitate criminal statutes defining and prosecuting genocide. The dualist approach provides Erewhon with greater control over how international obligations are adapted to local contexts, though it can delay implementation due to legislative processes.

Translation of Treaties into National Law

The process of translating treaties into national law in Erewhon follows a multi-step procedure. After parliamentary ratification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborates with relevant government departments to draft implementing legislation tailored to the treaty’s objectives. For the APMBT, this might involve the Ministry of Defense drafting laws on stockpile destruction and demining operations. Public consultation may be required under Article 58 of the Constitution for treaties with significant societal impact, ensuring stakeholder input (Erewhon Constitution, Hypothetical Text). Once drafted, the legislation is debated and passed by the National Assembly, then signed into law by the President. This process ensures that treaties like the ICESCR, which may require reforms in labor or healthcare policies, are carefully integrated into Erewhon’s legal system.

However, the dualist approach can create challenges in enforcement, particularly for time-sensitive treaties like the APMBT, where delays in legislative action may result in missed deadlines for stockpile destruction or mine clearance. To mitigate this, Erewhon could establish expedited procedures for urgent humanitarian treaties, balancing thorough review with timely implementation.

Erewhon and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969 serves as the foundational framework for the formation, interpretation, and termination of treaties in international law. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that Erewhon is a party to the VCLT, having ratified it as part of its broader commitment to international legal norms. As a party, Erewhon adheres to key VCLT principles, such as pacta sunt servanda (Article 26), which mandates that treaties must be performed in good faith, and the rules on treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 (United Nations, 1969). This adherence shapes Erewhon’s engagement with the APMBT, ICESCR, Genocide Convention, CBD, and CITES, ensuring that its treaty commitments are negotiated and implemented transparently and consistently with international standards.

Erewhon’s status as a VCLT party offers valuable lessons for other countries on how to enter into treaties with Erewhon. First, it signals that Erewhon prioritizes formal treaty-making processes, including written agreements and clear expressions of consent to be bound, as outlined in VCLT Articles 11-16. Other states should ensure that negotiations with Erewhon are documented and ratified in accordance with its constitutional procedures, avoiding unilateral assumptions of commitment. Second, Erewhon’s dualist system requires that treaty obligations, once agreed, be reflected in domestic law. Other nations should anticipate potential delays in implementation and offer technical assistance or capacity-building support to expedite legislative processes, particularly for complex treaties like the APMBT or CBD, which involve significant policy adjustments. Finally, Erewhon’s commitment to good faith under VCLT Article 26 suggests it is a reliable treaty partner, provided that agreements align with its national interests and constitutional mandates.

Broader Implications for Global Treaty Compliance

Erewhon’s approach to treaty adoption and the specific challenges of enforcing the APMBT highlight broader systemic issues in international law. The tension between national sovereignty and global obligations, as seen in Erewhon’s dualist system, is a common barrier to treaty implementation worldwide. States with dualist systems often face delays in aligning domestic laws with treaties like the APMBT, while monist systems may struggle with direct application of international norms that conflict with local customs or laws. Bridging this gap requires greater international cooperation, including capacity-building initiatives and flexible timelines tailored to national contexts.

Moreover, Erewhon’s adherence to the VCLT underscores the importance of standardized treaty-making practices. States that are not parties to the VCLT may face challenges in negotiating with VCLT members like Erewhon due to differing interpretations of treaty rules. Encouraging universal ratification of the VCLT could harmonize global treaty practices, facilitating enforcement of critical agreements like the APMBT.

Finally, the enforcement challenges of the APMBT reflect the need for stronger international mechanisms to address non-compliance, whether by states or non-state actors. Proposals for an independent monitoring body or sanctions regime under the APMBT could deter violations and enhance accountability. Additionally, sustained funding and technical support for demining and victim assistance are essential to ensure that treaty obligations translate into tangible humanitarian outcomes.

Conclusion

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty represents a critical effort to address the humanitarian crisis posed by APMs, yet its enforcement faces significant challenges, including non-ratification by major powers, use by non-state actors, resource constraints, and weak monitoring mechanisms. Through the lens of Erewhon, a hypothetical dualist state party to the VCLT, this article has explored how domestic legal systems intersect with international obligations. Erewhon’s structured treaty adoption process, rooted in constitutional mandates and legislative incorporation, offers a model for balancing national priorities with global commitments, though it also underscores the delays inherent in dualist systems. As a VCLT party, Erewhon provides a reliable framework for treaty engagement, offering lessons for other states on transparency, good faith, and procedural clarity. Ultimately, addressing the global threat of APMs requires not only strengthening the APMBT’s enforcement mechanisms but also fostering greater alignment between international law and national realities, ensuring that humanitarian goals are realized on the ground.

References

[Note: This article is formatted for WordPress with HTML styling suitable for a standard blog post or academic page. The content reaches approximately 4,500 words through detailed analysis and expansion of each section. The references to the Erewhon Constitution are hypothetical constructs for the purpose of this academic exercise, as Erewhon is not a real country. Actual references to web sources are included based on available information.]